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IN Tl-IE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:\'.\TIOX1\L .. \~IERICAN LIFE 
1:\'SUIL\XCE COMPANY, suc-
('essor to COXTINENTAL RE-
PlTBLIC LIFE INSURANCE 
l'O:\IP.\NY. Plaintiff-Appellant~ Case No. 
vs. 
IL\YOl' COUNTRl'" CLUB, INC., 
a lrtah corporation, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
10138 
BRIEF OF AJ)IICUS CURIAE 
PT .. \H BA:Nl\:ERS ASSOCIATION 
PRELI)IINARY STATEMENT 
This amicus has no interest in the controversy 
between the two parties in this case. Its brief is sub-
mitted solely as an aid to the Court in the determination 
of the contention in Point V of appellant's brief that 
section 15-1-2 l~tah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
is unconstitutional. 
3 
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The interest of this amicus in the issue as to the con-
stitutionality of section 15-1-2, however, is not merely 
academic. The Association has as members some fifty-
three banks in the state of Utah which had loans out-
standing on June 30, 1964, in excess of $768,000,000. 
These loans came from deposits totaling $1,180,000,000, 
of which some $980,000,000 represented deposits of 
individuals, partnerships and corporations in the state 
of Utah.l 
As of June 30, 1964, the most recent date of reports 
to the State Bank Commissioner, there were outstand-
ing installment loans held by the banks in Utah totaling 
$156,185,000-over $71,000,000 to finance automobile 
purchases,' nearly $25,000,000 to finance the purchase 
of other consumer goods, $18,500,000 for home moderni-
zation and repair, and the balance in personal loans. 
All these loans were made under the authority of pro-
viso (g) to section 15-1-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended. If appellant's attack on that proviso be 
successful, and assuming that the average discount rate 
on these installment loans is 6 per cent, the potential 
liability of the banks in the state for treble damages 
under section 15-1-7 Utah Code Annotated 1953, is over 
$97,000,000-an amount approximately equal to the 
combined capital accounts of all banks in Utah as of 
June 30, 1964,, of $101,976,000. 
These figures, which do not include the $300,000,-
000 of loans outstanding by the fifteen building and loan 
IThe source of these figures is the Report of the State Banking 
Department as of June 30, 1964. 
4 
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ussoeiations doing business in the state, demonstrate, 
without the rweessity of any elaboration, the econmnic 
l'alnmity which appellant's attack on the constitution-
ality of sed ion 1 ;)-1-:!, if successful, would inflict on the 
state. \Ve have no way to Ineasure the catastrophic loss 
to this state if all its financial institutions became bank-
rupt, resulting from the treble damage actions brought 
by borrowers under section 15-1-7 on the basis of the 
invalidity of section 15-1-2 (g). But the figures do show 
that the financial institutions of this state have invested 
a substantial portion of their depositors' funds in loans 
of ,·arious kinds in reliance upon the Utah interest laws. 
As the New 1\tiexico Supreme Court noted in First 
7'hrift and Loan Association v. State_, 62 N. Mex. 61, 
304 P.2d 582 (1956): 
"'V e have carefully considered these far reach-
ing and portentous assaults on the whole banking 
structure of the state, extending from its very 
foundations to its entire superstructure. Since 
statehood, or well nigh a half century the legal-
ity and basic soundness of the statutes upon 
which rests the banking business, as it has evolved 
fron1 a small beginning to its now more than 
billion dollar status, have been more or less ac-
cepted and acquiesced' in by those engaged 
therein, those who leave their earnings and profits 
there and, as well, those who look to banks for 
succor and aid when financial reverses come to 
plague and torment their peace of mind. We 
should have to be moved by stronger and more 
persuasive reasons than any here presented, be-
fore pronouncing judgment that would topple a 
business so vital and well entrenched as the one 
5 
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now assailed. None of the challenges on con-
stitutional grounds are meritorious. All are 
denied." 304 P .2d 582, 588. 
Thus we confess that this brief is submitted frankly 
in support of the validity of the statute, should this 
Court find that resolution of that question is necessary 
to the disposition of the case before it. 
I. SECTION 15-1-2 UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953 DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 24 OR ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
A. The Constitution requires that the Legislature 
not be unreasonable or arbitrary in its classifications. 
Appellant contends that section 15-1-2 violates 
both article I, section 24 and article VI, section 26 of 
the Utah Constitution. Article I, section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution proviQ.es: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uni-
form operation." 
Article VI, section 26 provides: 
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting 
any private or special laws in the following 
cases: ... ( 9) Regulating the interest on money . 
. . . In all cases where a general law can be ap-
plicable, no special law shall be enacted." 
Before considering specifically the Utah interest 
statute, section 15-1-2, in the context of these constitu-
tional provisions, attention should first be given to this 
6 
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Court's interpretation of the cited sections of the Utah 
Constitution since the Utah Legislature is not operating 
in u ,·m·utllll but with full awareness of the gloss of court 
decisions relating to these rather abstract clauses. 
lloth clauses of the Constitution cited above pose 
the probletu of what constitutes a "general" law as 
opposed to a "special" law, the one provision requiring 
thut only general laws be enacted with regard to certain 
types of legislation and the other merely going one step 
further to require that all such general laws operate 
uniformly. An early case treating this distinction be-
tween general and special laws is Love v. Liddle, 26 
Utah 62, 7'2 Pac. 185 ( 1903), in which the court stated 
that laws are objectionable if they either do not extend 
to the whole subject to which their provisions would 
be equally applicable, thus permitting a diversity of 
law relating to the same subject, or if they are not 
fran1ed to haYe uniform operation even though embrac-
ing the whole subject. In State v. Kallas~ 97 Utah 492, 
9-t P.2d 414 (1939), the Court approved the following 
definition of general laws: 
"Laws which apply to and operate uniformly 
upon all members of any class of persons, places, 
or things requiring legislation peculiar to t"Qem-
seh·es in the matters covered by the laws in ques-
tion, are general and not special." 94 P.2d 414, 
420. 
It is readily apparent that to be of a general nature 
laws need not pertain to all members of the community 
within the Legislature's jurisdiction, but need only 
7 
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operate uniformly as within certain classes of persons. 
This poses the more difficult question of what persons 
or subjects must be included in the class to which the 
law must uniformly operate. Even more recently, this 
Court stated with respect to classification: 
"General laws or laws of a general nature, or 
dealing with a specified subject, must, under 
our Constitution, have a uniform operation; but 
such provision does not prevent reasonable classi-
fication by the legislature, nor does it require that 
statutes be universal in their application or their 
result, or that they. operate uniformly with re-
spect to persons or things which are in fact differ-
ent." Abrahamsen v. Board of Review of The 
Industrial Commission~ 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P.2d 
213, 215 ( 1955). 
In Blackmarr v. City Cottrt of Salt Lake City~ 86 
Utah 541, 38 P.2d 725 (1934), this Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a statute providing, with respect 
to fraternal benefit societies, for a departure from the 
general law regulating service of summons on the 
ground that since a fraternal benefit society must ap-
point the state insurance commissioner its process agent, 
it was a reasonable classification to give all such societies 
the privilege of receiving an additional copy of the sum-
mons and additional time to answer. In upholding the 
validity of this classification against a claim of "special 
law" the court stated: 
"As 'the classification to be valid must rest 
upon some ground of difference having fair and 
sustantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion,' so also must a law to be valid providing for 
8 
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a departure from the general law regulating the 
service of summons upon a defendant 'rest upon 
some ~round of ditl'erence having a fair and sub-
staultal relation to the object of the legislation 
s< l t l m t all persons similarly circumstanced shall 
be treated alike.' " 38 P .2d 725, 729. 
The case most frequently cited by this Court as 
establishing the criteria by which the validity of classi-
fications n1ust be tested is State v. Mason~ 94 Utah 501, 
78 P.2d 9~0 ( 1938). The general rule there laid down 
and repeatedly quoted by this Court in subsequent 
opinions, is that if there is any reasonable basis for 
differentiation between classes based upon the purposes 
to be accmnplished by the act, such classification must 
be upheld as constitutional. The Court stated this rule 
more specifically as follows: 
"Of course, every legislative act is in one sense 
discritninatory. rrhe Legislature cannot legislate 
as to all persons and all subject matters. It is 
inclusive as some class or group and as to some 
lnunan relationships, transactions, or functions 
and exclusive as to the remainder. For that rea-
son, to be unconstitutional the discrimination 
must be unreasonable or arbitrary. A classifica-
tion is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its in-
clusion or exclusion features so long as there is 
smne basis for the differentiation between classes 
or subject Inatters included as compared to those 
excluded from its operation, provided the differ-
entiation bears a reasonable relation to the pur-
poses to be accomplished by the act. . . . The 
objects and purposes of a law present the touch-
stone for determining proper and improper classi-
fications." 78 P .2d 920, 923. 
9 
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In the Mason case appellant claimed that the 
statute upon which he was convicted contained an un-
reasonable classification by requiring persons to take 
out a license in order to buy farm products on credit or 
by check while exempting those who bought for cash 
or who were regularly licensed to sell tangible property 
at retail. The Court pointed out that the establishment 
of such classifications was widely discretionary with the 
Legislature, and that it is immaterial whether a court 
agreed with the judgment of the Legislature so long 
as it can be assumed that the Legislature had in mind 
some reason relating to the purpose to be accmnplished 
by the act: 
"There are very d~finite reasons for including 
one and excluding the other class which may have 
seemed adequate to the Legislature. We as the 
judiciary cannot supplant their judgment with 
ours. The farmer is on an entirely different basis 
than the manufacturer or the merchant in his 
ability to protect himself from itinerant pur-
chasers .... That here and there some shrewd 
and businesslike farmer may have more business 
acumen and be more cautious than some manu-
facturers or merchants does not affect the gen-
eral statement. If classifications of such large 
groups so differently situated were not possible, 
practical and realistic legislation would be im-
possible." 78 P .2d 920, 923. 
This same concept was expressed by this Court in 
Carter v. State Tax Commission~ 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 
727 ( 1939), in upholding the constitutionality of legis-
lation imposing varying registration fees for vehicles 
10 
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uccording to the weight of the vehicle and the type of 
fuel used. The Court found the classification to be 
rtasonable since the purpose of the act was to compen-
sate f'or wear and tear upon roads. Again the Court 
pointed out that it is up to the Legislature to set such 
lines of classification: 
"The Legislature detennines the lines of sepa-
ration between classes. That is their prerogative, 
and the courts have no right to interfere on any 
theory that those lines were improperly placed-
that the weights select~d for a division into 
classes were not properly selected. Presumably 
the Legislature had the necessary information 
before it to justify such segregation into classes. 
It is obvious that the ground of difference be-
tween classes has a fair and substantial relation 
to the object of the legislation, that is, to regu-
lation based upon the wear and tear to which 
the roads are subjected by the licensee." 96 P.2d 
727, 732. 
The Legislature's classification need not be perfect 
to be constitutionally valid so long as it aims generally 
at the object to be accon1plished by the law. In Abra-
hamsen t'. Board of Review~ 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P.2d 
213, 216 (1955), this court stated: 
"'Ye are committed to the rule that the court 
will not interfere with the legislativejudgment 
unless there is no fair reason for the law that 
would not require with equal force its extension 
to others which it leaves untouched. [Citing 
cases]. In the present instance, the type of pos-
sible discrimination cited by plaintiff is merely 
the result of the Legislature's not being able 
11 
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to make a perfect classification in all situations 
based on economic need, but the test in the main 
is directly pointed toward the achievement of 
the purpose of the Act." 
Applying this concept to section 15-1-2 the Legisla-
ture's prohibition against interest rates in excess of 10 
per cent need not be framed in all-embracing terms. 
Where there is a sound economic purpose to be served 
by allowing a cert&in class of lenders to charge a higher 
rate in order to supply funds to an important segment 
of the economy, such class may be constitutionally ex-
cluded from the general prohibition. And there is a 
presumption that the Legislature is deemed to have 
differentiated classes based upon reason and not upon 
arbitrary selection. The Supreme Court of the United 
States in Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas Rail-
road Commission~ 261 U.S. 379, 384 (1923), noted: 
"The reasons which influenced the classifica-
tion are not disclosed on the face of the act, but 
the mere absence of such disclosure will not 
justify the court in assuming that appropriate 
reasons did not in fact exist. The presumption 
is that the action of the legislature-which applies 
alike to all falling within the class-was with 
full knowledge of the conditions, and that no 
arbitrary selection of persons for subjection to 
the prescribed rule was intended." 
This Court has also recognized that the exceptions to 
a general law should be as narrowly drawn as reasonably 
possible so as to support the general nature of the law. 
For exa1nple, in Broadbent v. Gibson~ 105 Utah 53, 140 
12 
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P.:!d 939, 9l·ti ( 194H), this Court struck down the Utah 
Sunday closing law for the following reasons: 
"The exceptions in the Utah Sunday closing 
statutes are so broad that they in effect change 
the nature of this act from a general closing law, 
with exceptions, to a law aimed, without sufficin 
ent legal reason, at certain classes of businesses 
with a general exception to other classes which 
in effect is a grant of a special privilege to the 
exeepted elass while without legal excuse deny-
ing them to others." 
Here. section 15-1-2 is a general interest statute reflect-
ing the Legislature's intent to guard borrowers against 
excessive rates of interest. In allowing higher rates by 
a strictly regulated class of professional lenders in 
order to provide a source of funds for installment bor-
rowers. it has only created a narrow range of exceptions 
to a general proscription. 
An exa1nple of the application of the requirement 
of reasonable relationship between the class created 
and the objects of the legislation is the treatment of 
banks in section 34-10-2 relating to payment of wages 
nnd section 15-1-2 relating to interest on loans. 
In State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker~ Inc.~ 100 Utah 
j:,?3, 116 P.2d 766 (1941), this Court upheld the exclu-
sion of banks and mercantile houses from the operation 
of a statute requiring the payment of wages to em-
ployees semi-monthly and immediate payment upon 
demand of a discharged or a resigned employee. The 
Court applied the rule of State v. Mason and found 
that: 
13 
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"As to banks, the financial responsibility of 
the employer and the laws relative to banking 
reserves and bank examinations clearly might 
justify regarding their employees as a class to 
be bet~er protected than any included group 
against loss of earnings, while the kind of work-
ers employed might readily mark them as a group 
less in need of enforced frequent payn1ent, than 
any other." 116 P.2d 766, 770. 
However, in a· more recent case, Justice v. Standard 
Gilsonite Company~ 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2d 974 
( 1961), this Court expressly reconsidered the problem 
presented in the Walker case and again applying the 
rule of State v. Mason concluded that there was no 
reasonable basis for the exclusion of banks and mer-
cantile houses from a statute imposing penalties on em-
ployers for failure to pay wages to separated employees 
within twenty-four hours after demand. The Court's 
declaration of the invalidity of the statute in the Justice 
case is relied upon heavily by appellant as evidence of 
the invalidity of the bank exception in the interest 
statute. Since the purposes of the statutes are com-
pletely unrelated to each othe~-the one being to insure 
the payment of wages to separated employees, the other 
to ·protect the borrowing public from excessive interest 
rates-the Justice case is not authority for plaintiff's 
contention that the interest statute is a discriminatory 
classification. 
Since the essence of the rule established in State 
v. Mason is that the classification must bear some rea-
sonable relationship to the purpose to be accomplished 
14 
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hy the act, it rnust be recognized that the Justice case 
only establishes that the exclusion of banks and mer-
t'antile houses is an unreasonable classification in a 
statute rt<ptiring the payment of wages to separated 
employees. 
\V l' cannot quarrel with this Court's conclusion 
in the J naticc case that banks are in no substantially 
ditferent position as employers than are other business 
corporations, but we think it clear that banks as lenders 
do stand in a different category. Their principal busi-
ness is lending the funds they hold on deposit. In that 
business they are strictly regulated and supervised by 
the state banking department to insure compliance with 
law. That is the basis of the Legislature's classification 
in proviso (g) to section 15·-1-2. 
Appellant's contention that all lenders constitute 
u dass to which interest legislation must equally apply 
is as invalid as the appellant's contention in State v. 
Packard Corporation, 77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013 
(1931), that all persons in the advertising business must 
be treated alike. In the Packard case, this· Court upheld 
u statute prohibiting the advertising of cigarettes on 
billboards while permitting such advertising in news-
papers, n1agazines, and periodicals. In referring to the 
Pac~·ard case, this court in State v. Mason states: 
"[I]t should not require much strain of the 
imagination when the classifications can be that 
refined. to justify a classification between farmers 
on one side and manufacturers and merchants or 
others on the other side." 78 P.2d 920, 923. 
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We submit that this statement is equally applicable to 
the case at bar; i.e., "to justify a classification between 
banks and other lenders subject to supervision and reg-
ulation by the state bank commissioner on one side and 
unregulated lenders on the other side.'' The Court stated 
further in the Packard case: 
"Certainly all persons similarly situated are 
treated alike, since the law applies equally to all 
engaged in billboard advertising." 297 Pac. 1019. 
Again we submit that this statement is equally applic-
able with respect to the interest statute and might be 
restated as follows: 
"Certainly all persons similarly situated are 
treated alike, since the law applies equally to all 
supervised and regulated lenders (except small 
loan licensees which are treated elsewhere in the 
statute)." 
The statute involved in the Packard case was also. at-
tacked on federal constitutional grounds and was up-
held by the United States Supreme Court in an opinion 
by Justice Brandeis. Packard Corporation v. Utah, 
285 U.S. 1045 ( 1932), 52 S. Ct. 273, 76 L. Ed. 643, 
79 A.L.R. 546. 
Other Utah cases in which statutory classifications 
have been upheld under the State v. Mason rule and 
which have not found any distinction between article 
I, section 24 and article VI, section 26 of the Utah 
Constitution include the following: Merkley v. State 
16 
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Ttta:Cummissiun, 11 Utah 2d 336,358 P.2d 991 (1961); 
.t brahtill!Sl'll v. Board of Re'l'lC'lJ.' of the Industrial Co7n-
mi.'ls;on of Utah, a Utah 2d 289, 283 P.2d 213 (1955); 
Entre ~..\'ous Club t'. TorontoJ 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 
t)70 (1955); Kent Club v. TorontoJ 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 
P.:!d 870 (1957); Flansen v. Public Employees Retire-
ment S,1Jste1n Board of AdministrationJ 122 Utah 44, 
:!-tti P.:!d 591 (1952); Slater v. Salt Lake CityJ 115 
Utah 47H, 206 P.2d 153 ( 1949) ; W allberg v. Utah 
PubliC' Hrclfarc CommissionJ 115 Utah 242, 203 P.2d 
985 ( 1949) ; Patterick v. Ca1·bon Water ConservanclJ 
District, 106 Utah 55, 145 P.2d 503 (1944). 
Courts in other jurisdictions having constitutional 
provisions sitnilar to the Utah clauses under discussion 
have dealt specifically with problems relating to interest 
statutes. In T-Vrenn v. Portland Loan CompanyJ 64 
P.2d 520 (Ore. 1937), an attack was made on the 
Oregon Sn1all Loan Act on the grounds that it violated 
a provision of the Oregon Constitution prohibiting spe-
cial or local laws in relation to interest on money. The 
Oregon Stnall Loan Act allowed small loan licensees 
to cha1·ge 3 per cent per month on loans that were less 
than $300. lT pholding this exception from the general 
usury law, the Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
"A law may be general, however, and have but 
a local application, and it is none the less general 
and uniform, because it may apply to a desig-
nated class, if it operates equally upon all the 
subjects within the class for which the rule is 
adopted; ... [A] law is general when it operates 
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equally and uniformly upon all persons, places 
or things brought within the relation and cir-
cumstances for which it provided .... We shall 
only repeat that the classification need not be 
scientific nor logically appropriate, and if not 
palpably arbitrary, and is uniform within the 
class, it is within such discretion [of the Legis-
lature]:" 69 P .2d 520, 521 .. 
With respect to the Small Loan Act, the Oregon Su-
preme Court found that the Legislature saw fit to allow 
a greater rate of interest than permitted under the gen-
eral usury statute because of the greater risk involved 
with small loans, and that the Act was made to apply 
to everyone within the class. The court found further 
that the classification could not be deemed unreasonable 
or unjustifiable as it was within the legislative dis-
cretion. 
The Oregon case was cited with approval in 
Kelleher v. Minshull_, 119 P.2d 302 (1941), in which 
the Supreme Court of Washington similarly upheld the 
Washington Small Loan Act against the claim that 
it constituted an arbitrary classification. In its opinion 
the Washington court also distinguished Acme Finance 
Company v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341 (1937}, 
upon which appellant relies in its brief as authority 
for the proposition that the provisions of section 15-
1-2 (g) with respect to banks is an unconstitutional 
qualification. The Washington court noted that the 
statute reviewed in Acme Finance had been so emascu-
lated by the veto of a number of its sections that the 
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1·emuining portion of the statute did not carry out the 
legislative intent in ntaking the classification. 
In Cartt:r v. Seaboard P1inance Co._, 203 P.2d 758 
(Calif. 1949), the Supreme Court of California upheld 
n California constitutional amendment granting certain 
l'lasses of lenders special rates of interest against an 
nttnck under the 14th Amendment of the federal Con-
stitution. Even a dissenting judge concurred as to the 
reasonableness of classification with respect to banks 
on the basis that they were strictly regulated. 
The Connecticut interest statute which is very 
similar in its wording to the Utah statute and which 
prohibits the charging of interest in excess of 15 per 
cent per annutn was attacked on the ground that its 
exclusion of any national bank or other bank or trust 
company duly incorporated under the laws of the state 
denied other lenders equal protection of the laws. In 
Griffith v Connectic'ld_, 218 U.S. 563, 54 L.Ed. 1151 
( 1910). the Supreme Court of the United States sus-
tained the classification on the basis that banks and 
other corporations excluded from operation of the act 
were subject to regulation by bank commissioners and 
were managed by those experienced in financial opera-
tions who were familiar with the day-to-day money 
market. In affirming the Connecticut Supreme Court's 
decision upholding the classification, the United States 
Supreme Court stated that the contentions against the 
correctness of the state court decision were so wholly 
without merit as not to require further argument. 
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Similarly, in Mutual Loan Company v. Martell) 
222 U.S. 225, 56 L. Ed. 175 (1911), the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of national banks 
and banks under the supervision of the bank com-
missioner and certain local companies from a Massa-
chusetts statute invalidating wage assignments unless 
in writing, filed and recorded and with the written con-
sent of the wife. Appellant claimed such exclusion 
denied equal protection of the laws. In sustaining the 
classification the United States Supreme Court stated: 
"We have declared so often the wide range 
of discretion which the legislature possesses in 
classifying the objects of its legislation that we 
may be excused from a citation of the cases. We 
shall only repeat that the classification need not 
be scientific nor logically appropriate, and if 
not palpably arbitrary, and is uniform within 
the class, it is within such discretion. The legis-
lation under review was directed at certain evils 
which had arisen, and the legislature, considering 
them and from whence they arose, might have 
thought or discerned that they could not or would 
not arise from a greater freedom to the institu-
tions mentioned than to individuals. This was 
the view that the supreme judicial court took, 
and, we think, rightly took. The court said that 
the legislature might have decided that the 
dangers which the statute was intended to pre-
vent would not exist in any considerable degree 
in loans made by institutions which were under 
the supervision of bank commissioners, and 'be-
lieved rightly that the business done by them 
would not need regulation in the interest of .em-
ployees or employers.' " 222 U.S. 225. 
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The rules for establishing whether or not a classi-
tication is discritninatory were summarized by the 
Fnitcd States Supreme Court in Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Company, 220 U.S. 61, 78, 79, ( 1911), 
,;;; L.Ed. 369, 377, 31 S. Ct. 337, and were recently 
reiterated by the court in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S . 
. t;)7 (1957), 1 L.Ed. 2d 1485, 77 S. Ct. 1344, as follows: 
"1. The equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth An1endment does not take from the State 
the power to classify in the adoption of police 
laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope 
of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is 
done only when it is without any reasonable 
basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classi-
fication having some reasonable basis does not 
offend against that clause merely because it is 
not made with mathematical nicety or because 
in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When 
a classification in such a law is called in question, 
if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived 
that would sustain it, the existence of that state 
of facts at the time the law was enacted must be 
assmned. 4. One who assails the classification in 
such a law must carry the burden of showing 
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, 
but is essentially arbitrary." 354 U.S. 457, 463-
464. 
B. The classifications adopted by the Utah Legis-
lature in section 15-1-2 are not unreasonable or arbi-
trary. 
Appellant bases its attack on the constitutionality 
of the lTtah interest statutes on the provisos to section 
15-1-2. It is submitted that the classifications there 
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selected by the Legislature meet the standards promul~ 
gated by this Court and the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the cases above discussed. A brief 
review of the provisions of 15-1-2 clearly demonstrates 
the reasonableness of the legislative classifications. 
Subsections (a) and (b) are not interest provisions 
at all. They merely make clear that in addition to 
interest (the charge for the use of the money) , a lender 
(other than under subsection (g) ) may charge a service 
fee not to exceed 4 per cent and all lenders on all loans 
may provide for reasonable collection costs and attor-
ney's fees in the event of default or delinquency. 
Appellant raises no issue with subsections {a) and 
(b) nor with (c) which allows a high rate of interest 
for the first mont~ on loans o£ less than $100. Appar-
ently, appellant concedes this is a reasonable classifica-
tion because of the very small size of the loans. 
Subsections (d), (e) and (f) are housekeeping 
provisions adopted by the Legislature in the 1955 revi~ 
sion of section 15~1-2 to make clear that the specific 
legislation dealing with the. regulation and powers of 
small loan licensees, credit unions and industrial loan 
corporations are exceptions to the general interest 
statute. The validity of these three provisos thus turns 
on the validity of the specific legislation regulating these 
classes of lenders. 
The Small Loan Act, chapter 10 of Title 7, has 
been upheld universally when questioned on constitu-
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Lionnl grounds. St-e the long list of cases fron1 Inany 
.i urisdidions cited by the \Vashington court in I~elleher 
1·. Jlinshu/1. 119 P.2d 302 (1941). 
The reasoning of these cases is spelled out in the 
rcct>nt Nebraska decision upsetting its conditional sales 
t·ontrad law in Elder v. Doerr~ 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.\V. 
~d .>~H (1963), where the Nebraska court said with 
rcsped to a constitutional provision similar to article 
YI, section 26 of the Utah constitution: 
"Article Ill, section 18, of the Constitution 
provides in part: 'The Legislature shall not pass 
local or special laws in any of the following cases, 
that is to say: * * ** Regulating the interest 
on money.' Under this section of the Constitu-
tion, the Legislature may fix the rates of interest 
that may be charged for the hire of money or 
the forbearance of debt in installment sale con-
tracts, if the classification is reasonable and has 
relation to the public interest. That a reasonable 
classification is required in this type of case is 
made clear in Althaus v. State, 99 Neb. 465, 156 
N.\Y. 1038, wherein it is said: 'The law assailed 
regulates the interest chargeable by two classes 
-unlicensed lenders of money limited to 10 per 
cent per annum, and licensed lenders authorized 
to make an additional charge, called a "broker-
age fee," not exceeding one-tenth of the money 
actually lent and, in exceptional cases, to charge 
an examination fee of 50 cents. The latter class 
is open to all who comply with the terms of the 
statute. One class of borrowers may be required 
to pay Iuore for their loans than others, but this 
condition already existed and was not created 
by legislation. The lawmakers recognized a class 
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of borrowers from whom exorbitant rates of in-
terest had been exacted under existing conditions 
and attempted to afford them some measure of 
protection. Those making such loans are required 
to obtain a license. Their methods of doing busi-
ness are regulated. The act makes no discrimi-
nation against any class of borrowers. It is not 
unconstitutional as being a "local or special law 
* * * regulating the interest on money." The 
better rule is that the classification is neither 
unreasonable nor arbitrary. It is also clear that 
the act does not deny the equal protection of the 
laws.' " 
The reasoning of the Nebraska court as to the rea-
sonableness of this type of classification also applies 
to the legislation creating and regulating credit unions 
( c~apter 9 of Title 7) and industrial loan corporations 
(chapter 8 of Title 7). It also supports the classifica-
tion in subsection (g), the apparent source of. appel-
lant's primary attack on the whole of section 15-1-2. 
Subsection (g) is the only new aspect included in 
the 1955 amendments to section 15-1-2. It makes two 
classifications : one on the size and nature of the loan, 
i.e., those repayable in installments over a period not 
in, ,, exc~ss of sixty-three months and not exceeding 
$5,000 in principal amount-and the other on the basis 
of the identity of the lender, i.e., any corporation, 
exc,ept smalllqan licensees,' operating under the super-
vision of the state banking departiD:ent, and national 
banks and federal savings and loan associations doing 
business in the state. 
The first basis of classification in subsection (g) 
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is similar to that on which subsection (c) is founded, 
which appellant does not attack. The courts have long 
recognized that classification based on the size of the 
loan is valid. 1 n re fl ome Discount Co._, 147 Fed. 538 
(D.C. Ala. 1906) ; State v. Wickenhoefer_, 6 Pa. 120, 
ti-t Atl. 273 (Del. Ct. of Gen. Sess., 1906); Edwards 
'"' State. ()2 Fla. 40, 56 So. 401 ( 1911) ; Cole v. Frank-
lin Plan Co., 176 Ga. 561, 168 S.E . 261 ( 1933) ; 
People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159, 118 N.E. 87 ( 1917) ; 
Ravitz v. Steurele .. 257 Ky. 108, 77 S.W. 2d 360 
(1934); State v. Hill_, 168 La. 761, 123 So. 317 (1929), 
69 A .. L.R. 57-J.; JVrenn v. Portland Loan Co._, 155 Ore. 
395, 6-J. P.2d 520 (1937); Commonwealth v. Puder., 
261 Pa. 129, 104 Atl. 505 (1918), aff'g (1917) 67 
Pa. Super. Ct. 11; State v. Sherman_, 18 Wyo. 169, 
105 Pac. 299 (1909), 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 898, Ann. 
Cas. 1912C 819. But compare Ex Parte Sohncke, 148 
Cal. 262. 82 Pac. 956 (1905), 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 
2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 813, 7 Ann. Cas. 475; Althaus v. 
State, 94 Neb. 780, 144 N .W. 799 ( 1913). The rea-
soning is obvious. Loans in small amounts repayable 
in installn1ents are more expensive to handle because 
of additional processing and bookkeeping required and 
the collection efforts necessary to secure repayment.l 
They also involve greater credit risks because of the 
nature of the borrower. 2 Loans of this nature form a 
1Loan loss ratios on installment loans run approximately 
double that for all loans held by banks and delinquency ratios 
involving costly collection efforts range even higher. 
~In 1955. about one-half of the consumer units with annual 
incomes ranging from $2,000 to $10,000 reported installment debt 
outstanding. CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT, Board of 
Governors, Federal Reserve System ( 1957), p. 87. 
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substantial portion of the nation's economy as they 
are involved in the financing of the purchase of auto-
mobiles, major appliances, farm equipment and mobile 
homes and in home modernization and repair. 
In 1957· the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System published a study on consumer in-
stallment credit in the United States. That study 
reported that at the end of 1955 there was outstanding 
in the United States approximately $30,000,000,0003 
in consumer installment credit, of which 37 per cent 
was held by the commercial banks of the country. Of 
the total of $30,000,000,000 of outstanding consumer 
credit in 1955, 46 per cent was represented by auto-
mobile paper, 26 per cent for loans to purchase other 
consumer goods, 6 per cent for repair and moderniza-
tion loans and 22 per cent for personal loans. The 
commercial banks of the country held 39 per cent of 
the automobile paper, 27 per cent of paper represent-
ing purchases -of other consumer goods and 31 per 
cent of personal installment loans. 
With respect to the effect of installment credit on 
the economic growth of the country, the Federal Re-
serve report stated: 
"This chapter has indicated that the growth 
of instalment credit has been an integral part 
of the development of the United States economy 
in the 20th century. Instalment credit has been 
viewed as a means of adaptation by both con-
3As of the end of 1963, consumer installment credit held by 
financial institutions in the United States totaled $46.9 billion. 
See "Federal Reserve Bulletin", August, 1964, p. 1064. 
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stuners and business to technological,econmnic 
nnd social developments that have transformed 
the l'onsumer into an owner of capital goods that 
provide him with services. Consumer debt has 
grown with the ownership of consumer capital 
as a reasonable method of amortizing its cost 
over a part of its service life. Furthermore, con-
sumer ownership of such assets eliminates con-
smner expenditures that would otherwise be made 
to business suppliers of services, offsetting in 
part xnonthly payments on instalment debt. Simi-
larly, the growth of instalment debt may be 
regarded as partly a substitute for business debt 
that would have been incurred if consumers had 
continued to rely on business for services instead 
of acquiring their own service-producing durable 
assets. 
"A part from this basic rationale for the de-
velopment of instalment credit, its growth can 
also be viewed as a cumulative process of action 
and reaction. The existence of instalment credit 
facilities, called forth by the need to finance auto-
Inobiles and other expensive durable goods, in-
fluenced attitudes toward borrowing and also 
led to the use of instalment credit for the financ-
ing of other goods and services. In turn, new 
types of credit facilities have been established. 
Use of instalment credit has thus become deeply 
embedded among the habits and customs of 
American consumers and businessmen.'' 
It is clear that the Legislature felt, in light of 
the importance of securing a source of funds for this 
important segment of the economy, that installment 
loans of the nature described should be treated sepa-
rately for the purpose of fixing the maximum interest 
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rates; applicable to them. One who assails the classi-
fication must carry the burden of showing that it does 
not rest on any reasonable basis, but is essentially 
arbitrary. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Ap-
pellant has neither claimed nor shown anything arbi-
trary or unreasonable in that determination. 
The second basis of classification in subsection 
(g)-. the nature and identity of the lender-is also 
well recognized. by the courts as a reasonable classi-
fication. Griffith v. Conn.~ 218 U.S. 563 (1910); 
M?ktual Loan Company v. Martell~ 222 U;S. 225 
(1911); Cavanaugh v. People~ 157 Pac. 200 (Colo. 
1916); Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co.~ 203 P.2d 758 
(Calif. 1949); Wrenn v. Portland Loan Company} 
64 P.2d 520 (Ore. 1937). 
In proviso (g) the lenders are those, other than 
small loan licensees, operating under the· supervision 
of the state banking department of Utah, national 
banks and federal savings and loan associations doing 
business in the state. The reason for the inclusion of the 
latter two is obviously to avoid the constitutional prob-
lem of discrimination between federal and state char-
tered institutions of similar import. Section 7-1-7 of 
U tab Code Annotated lists those financial institutions 
which are subject to the jurisdiction of the banking 
department. These are banks, building and loan asso-
ciations, industrial loan corporations and credit unions. 
In the first place, it should be noted that these are 
all institutions engaged primarily in the business of 
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lending money-the subject matter of interest. They 
ure all engaged in the pooling of the surplus funds of 
the comtnunity in the form of bank deposits, savings 
acl·ounts awl thrift accounts and using these funds to 
supply the credit needs of the Utah economy. One of 
these needs is for installment loans to finance home 
improven1ents, the purchase of automobiles and major 
nppliances and to 1neet the emergency cash requirements 
of the wage earner who can repay only on the install-
ment basis out of current earnings. 
Secondly, these lenders are all strictly regulated 
by the banking department. They cannot get into busi-
ness without the prior approval of the bank commis-
sioner, who checks into the plan of operation and the 
character, responsibility and general fitness of the in-
corporators or organizers to determine that the business 
will be honestly conducted in accordance with law and 
for the best interest of the members of the institution 
and for the public welfare. (Section 7-1-26 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953.) They are all subject to visitation 
and exmnination at least once a year by the banking 
department (section 7-1-8) , to determine if they are 
conducting their business in accordance with law, and 
they are required to pay special fees for such examina-
tion and supervision (section 7-1-10). They must keep 
their books and records open for inspection by the bank-
ing department and in such form as will enable it to 
inm1ediately ascertain their condition, (section 7-1-12) . 
Their officers and employees must be bonded (section 
i -3-25). and may be removed from office if dishonest, 
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reckless or incompetent or for failure to perform any 
duty of office (section 7-1-17) . The directors of all such 
institutions are required to examine regularly the books 
and affairs of each such corporation (section 7-1-14). 
The banking department may take over their property 
and affairs and liquidate them if the bank commissioner 
determines they have violated the law or are otherwise 
operating improperly (section 7-2-1 et seq.). They may 
establish and operate branch offices only if approved 
by the bank commissioner (sections 7-3-6 and 7-7-2). 
Savings and loan associations (section 7-7-5), credit 
unions (section 7-9-16) and industrial loan corporations 
(section 7-8-5) are limited as to the size and nature of 
the loans they may make.l 
It is obvious that the purpose of the legislature in 
enacting subsection (g) was to provide a source of 
funds for the installment borrowing needs of the state. 
Its selection of those engaged primarily in the lending 
business and already strictly regulated by the banking 
department to assure compliance with the law is clearly 
a reasonable classification.2 As the Colorado Supreme 
Court in Cavanaugh v. People~ supra~ noted: 
"The exceptions, however, appear to be rea-
sonable, inasmuch as they cover only money lend-
ers who are already subject to governmental 
supervision and control." 
-----
!Similar extensive regulation and supervision is maintained by 
the Comptroller of the Currency over national banks and by the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board over federal savings and loan 
associations. State member banks of the Federal Reserve System 
are also regulated and supervised by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System and all insured banks by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
zSimilar classification is made by thirty-four other states with 
respect to installment loans by banks as shown by the following 
table: 
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MAJOR PROVISIONS OF STATE LAWS REGULATING PERSONAL 
INSTALMENT LOANS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, 
SEPTEMBER, 1956 
State Loan Limit 
,\l~b.lnl<l .................................. None ........................... . 
,\IHk.l ........................................ $3,500 ........................... . 
AlllUna ...................................... $1,000 ........................... . 
Connecticut (savings banks $1,000 .......................... . 
and departments) . 
~rr :.:;:••• •·••• •;:: ~;t· • ::•:••••••• KAmJ•~ (under the usury $2,000 ........................... . 
l~w) .................................... .. 
Kcnhacky ................................. - $5,000 .......................... .. 
~!Jinc (savings banks) .......... $1,000 ...........................• 
M~suchusetts ~ (savings $1 1000 (exclusi.ve of banks and derartaments) ...• mterest or d1sco~nt) 
Michigan .................................. ·• rer cent of cap1tal 
.Maximum I Maximum rate (percent per 
(mt~~tl.s) annum) and type of charge 
----+--------------------
None 6; add-on. 
None 6; discount. 
None 8; discount 
18 6; discount. 
36 6; discount. 
No'1e 6; discount. 
Non~ 6; discount. 
None 8; discount 
3 7 6; discount. 
30 8; add on or discount. 
37 6; discount on first $2,500; 
5 per cent on balance 
36 None. 
24 Rate to be approved by 
Commissioner. 
36 7; discount. 
and surplus. 
Minnesota ............................. $2, ~00 ............................ 3 years 6; .'iscount. 
Missl'si~r' ............................... $~00 .............................. None 8; discount 
M&SSlJUrl 2 ...................................................................................................... .. 
~:~j~::~ ... ~{~;~~::~~~ ;;~~·~~E~<.ft~ti=: :.:·... ~;~t ;; ,:;;;~;:: 
Ohio (savings and special "Jone ............................ None 8; d1scount 
plan banks). . ........................ . 
Orqon 2 (under the banking s~oo ............................. . 
law) ...................................... . 
Pennsylvania .............................. S3. 500 
Rhode Island (savings banks $1,000 
J nJ departments) • .. ............. . 
'outh Carolina 4 ...................... $1,000 
South Dakota .......................... $3,000 
fcxas .......................................... None 





::on~~gi~~~ ... :::::::::::::::::::::: ~~~~0 
$1.000 
None $8 per $100 charged in lieu 
of interest on first $500 of 
principal; 10 percent 
simple on balance. 
36 6; discount. 
18 Fixed by Department of 
Business Regulation 
12-18 7; discount. 
36 a; add-on first $1,000, 6 per 
cent add-on on balance. 
None 7; discount ( 5 percent plus 2 
percent fee) . 
63 7; discount, but Q')t exceed-
!ng 14 percent ~mple 
mterest. 
None Not specified in law. 
None 6; discount; plus a 2 percent 
investigation fee on loans 
........................... not exceeding $1,000. 
None 6; discount. 
None 10 percent simple, plus $1 
oer 90 days on outstand-
ing balances. 
None 8; discount 
, ~ limit is 10 perce.nt of capital and surplus, if paid-in capital exceeds $10,000. 
• • ~nksl may be hcensed under small-loan law and then operate under the provisions shown in 
..u e 17. 
, 3 ~~oans of less than $1,000 at an interest rate in excess of 18 percent per annum borrower may 
: _. l acge loan by. tendering principal plus 18 percent interest plus $5 fee. ' 
~"' ~r term apphes t•> secured loans. 
:' Longer term applies to loans for property repair, alteration, or improvement. 
: FSoedurce: CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT, Board of Governors 
eral Reserve System ( 1957), p. 65. ' 
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CONCLUSION 
The Legislature has met all of the criteria deline-
ated by this Court in its interpretation of article I, 
section 24, and article VI, section 26 of the Utah Con-
stitution. Section 15-1-2 is a general statute fixing the 
maximum rate of interest to which parties to a loan 
transaction may agree. Its provisos are reasonable 
classifications b~sed on the size and nature of the loan. 
The lenders affected are those engaged primarily in the 
lending business and strictly regulated and supervised 
by the state banking department. These classifications 
have a reasonable relationship to the purpose of interest 
regulation-protection of borrowers against uncon-
scionable charges, yet providing a source of funds for 
the credit needs of every segment of the economy. 
The constitutionality of section 15-1-2 should ~e 
sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Peter W. Billings 
Jeanette C. Douglas 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
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